Latest

  • Wellesley Drilling Engineer 21/12 09:27
    Wellesley 35/10-10S Drilling Engineer 21/12 09:22
    Wellesley 35/10-10S Åse Kristin Pettersen 24/10 08:29
    During operation several MoC’s were made. A link to the risk register was enclosed in the MoC report. The link was to the risk register for the well. It was then difficult to identify the risk related to the MoC and who participated in that. . .
    Wellesley 35/10-10S Stian Engvik 23/10 11:23
    Risk of WOW during Carmen CAN-Ductor installation and recovery leading to Wellesley being responsible for WOW cost.
  • Wellesley Drilling Engineer 21/12 09:27
    Wellesley 35/10-10S Drilling Engineer 21/12 09:22
    Wellesley 35/10-10S Åse Kristin Pettersen 24/10 08:29
    During operation several MoC’s were made. A link to the risk register was enclosed in the MoC report. The link was to the risk register for the well. It was then difficult to identify the risk related to the MoC and who participated in that. . .
    Wellesley 35/10-10S Stian Engvik 23/10 11:23
    Risk of WOW during Carmen CAN-Ductor installation and recovery leading to Wellesley being responsible for WOW cost.

Latest

  • WE/MoC-7-2023 Major 05/04 08:07
    WE/MoC-6-2022 Minor 08/01 11:46
    9 5/8″ casing hanger normally run with seal assembly and lock ring. Decided to remove the lock ring prior to RIH. Reason to remove the lock ring: The . . . lock ring is considered to be a “weak point” in the system. The lock-ring is one of the components of the seal assembly, and it’s installed into its profile with a “lock ring retainer” secured by 2 grooved pins and 2 cap screws. From past experience, it is possible that while RIH the lock ring retainer can “snap”, and the lock ring can be lost in hole. The adverse weather conditions forecasted at Hemispheres location in the coming days will increase the risk in both loosing the lock-ring and the time spent to eventually fish-it. Risk Assessment: – Sealing capability and integrity of the seal assembly is not impaired by the absence of the lock-ring. – The casing hanger can be correctly landed in the HPH. The weight of the casing string is acting on the landing shoulder. – The lock-ring can easily be removed “on-deck” prior running the CHASART without removing the seal assembly (i.e. no need for a separate trip to run the seal assy). – NO DST performed on Hemispheres. Consequently, significant less temperature development at the wellhead to be expected. – 8 ½” section has low flow rate and the static temperature is low in this location. – The TOC planned in 9 5/8” will never create a trapped annulus between casings.
    WLSY/MoC-5-2020 Minor 03/09 06:53
    Following the last MoC, a decision was made to continue to drill the pilot hole to TD @ 632 m RKB after identifying a shallow gas sone on LWD logs @ . . . 331 m RKB and visible bubbles on ROV. Plan will be as follows: During drilling of 9 7/8” pilot hole no observation of bubbles was seen during drilling, or new sones identified on LWD logs. At TD the well was flow checked with seawater for approx. 2 hours. A significant decline of bubbles was observed on video and sonar in this period, indicating decreasing trend and depletion of the sone. Shallow water not suspected. Decision to move forward as per program and open up 9 7/8” pilot hole to 17 ½” on the basis the thin (0.5m) gas bearing sand lens that has been drilled is not a threat to the rig or well integrity as now depleted. Drill 17 ½” section with seawater and pump mud at connections, same as for the pilot hole. Halliburton performed a gel-test of two slurries and based on the result of this test, the surface casing will be run and cemented with a Tuned Light lead and tail with an EcoSpacer ahead. The cement blend has been tested with gel-strenght vs. gas flow.
    WLSY/MoC-4-2020 Minor 03/09 06:36
    The Schweinsteiger well was planned with 30” conductor shoe at +/- 307 m RKB. A 9 7/8” pilot hole was going to be drilled to planned depth of the . . . surface casing shoe at 632 m RKB to check for shallow gas. The risk of gas was expected to be low ref. site survey. Ran and cemented 30” conductor as per program. RIH with 9 7/8” BHA and drilled to 340 m RKB (33 m below the conductor shoe). At 340 m, the LWD logs showed a drop in GR and spike in the resistivity at drilled depth 331 m. Flow checked well and bubbles were observed by the ROV. Immediately started to pump 1.50 sg kill mud with returns to seabed. Well observed to be killed and stable. Monitored with ROV. Plan will be as follows: Drill 30 m controlled with 9 7/8” pilot hole BHA and 1.25 sg pump & dump and perform new flow check. No new zones identified on logs. Flow check and discuss way further 18:30 28.08.20 with onshore and offshore organization – operator and contractor present. Burst of bubbles observed at wellhead housing during flowcheck. Displace to “new” 1.25 sg mud to see if any air trapped in system. Commence drilling with seawater and pump mud at connections and drill to TD and log formations. This will gather valuable information regarding hole condition and way forward. Only small amount of bubbles observed and able to kill with 1.50 sg MW. Will monitor for GR/Res changes for any new shallow gas sones, if identified, stop and flow check to observe for increasing trend. If yes, kill well.
  • WE/MoC-7-2023 Major 05/04 08:07
    WE/MoC-6-2022 Minor 08/01 11:46
    9 5/8″ casing hanger normally run with seal assembly and lock ring. Decided to remove the lock ring prior to RIH. Reason to remove the lock ring: The . . . lock ring is considered to be a “weak point” in the system. The lock-ring is one of the components of the seal assembly, and it’s installed into its profile with a “lock ring retainer” secured by 2 grooved pins and 2 cap screws. From past experience, it is possible that while RIH the lock ring retainer can “snap”, and the lock ring can be lost in hole. The adverse weather conditions forecasted at Hemispheres location in the coming days will increase the risk in both loosing the lock-ring and the time spent to eventually fish-it. Risk Assessment: – Sealing capability and integrity of the seal assembly is not impaired by the absence of the lock-ring. – The casing hanger can be correctly landed in the HPH. The weight of the casing string is acting on the landing shoulder. – The lock-ring can easily be removed “on-deck” prior running the CHASART without removing the seal assembly (i.e. no need for a separate trip to run the seal assy). – NO DST performed on Hemispheres. Consequently, significant less temperature development at the wellhead to be expected. – 8 ½” section has low flow rate and the static temperature is low in this location. – The TOC planned in 9 5/8” will never create a trapped annulus between casings.
    WLSY/MoC-5-2020 Minor 03/09 06:53
    Following the last MoC, a decision was made to continue to drill the pilot hole to TD @ 632 m RKB after identifying a shallow gas sone on LWD logs @ . . . 331 m RKB and visible bubbles on ROV. Plan will be as follows: During drilling of 9 7/8” pilot hole no observation of bubbles was seen during drilling, or new sones identified on LWD logs. At TD the well was flow checked with seawater for approx. 2 hours. A significant decline of bubbles was observed on video and sonar in this period, indicating decreasing trend and depletion of the sone. Shallow water not suspected. Decision to move forward as per program and open up 9 7/8” pilot hole to 17 ½” on the basis the thin (0.5m) gas bearing sand lens that has been drilled is not a threat to the rig or well integrity as now depleted. Drill 17 ½” section with seawater and pump mud at connections, same as for the pilot hole. Halliburton performed a gel-test of two slurries and based on the result of this test, the surface casing will be run and cemented with a Tuned Light lead and tail with an EcoSpacer ahead. The cement blend has been tested with gel-strenght vs. gas flow.
    WLSY/MoC-4-2020 Minor 03/09 06:36
    The Schweinsteiger well was planned with 30” conductor shoe at +/- 307 m RKB. A 9 7/8” pilot hole was going to be drilled to planned depth of the . . . surface casing shoe at 632 m RKB to check for shallow gas. The risk of gas was expected to be low ref. site survey. Ran and cemented 30” conductor as per program. RIH with 9 7/8” BHA and drilled to 340 m RKB (33 m below the conductor shoe). At 340 m, the LWD logs showed a drop in GR and spike in the resistivity at drilled depth 331 m. Flow checked well and bubbles were observed by the ROV. Immediately started to pump 1.50 sg kill mud with returns to seabed. Well observed to be killed and stable. Monitored with ROV. Plan will be as follows: Drill 30 m controlled with 9 7/8” pilot hole BHA and 1.25 sg pump & dump and perform new flow check. No new zones identified on logs. Flow check and discuss way further 18:30 28.08.20 with onshore and offshore organization – operator and contractor present. Burst of bubbles observed at wellhead housing during flowcheck. Displace to “new” 1.25 sg mud to see if any air trapped in system. Commence drilling with seawater and pump mud at connections and drill to TD and log formations. This will gather valuable information regarding hole condition and way forward. Only small amount of bubbles observed and able to kill with 1.50 sg MW. Will monitor for GR/Res changes for any new shallow gas sones, if identified, stop and flow check to observe for increasing trend. If yes, kill well.

Latest

  • WE/109-2023 / Incident 08/09 06:31
    An project related email sendt by me to Morten Laget, ended up being posted to WEHome feed. This without my knowledge or intent to do so. The . . . nature of the email was not of a sensitive content. The email was sent from tommy.skjolde@wellexpertise.com to morten@wellexpertise.com, with a cc to hseq@wellexpertise.com. Intermediate checks have not given an explanation to why this happened and subsequently not a solution on how to prevent this from happening again. Checks involved Anniken, Daniel and Lars. One question came up during my checks; “Is there some kind of ‘automation’ attached to the cc email address?”
    WE/108-2023 / Incident 03/05 11:59
    NPT: 0.5 hrs Cost approximately: 104 000 NOK Troubleshoot Dop Application Machine (DAM). – Did not retract after function testing
    WE/107-2023 / Incident 03/05 11:50
    NPT: 7.75 hrs Cost approximately: 1 614 000 NOK Cyber chair stopped functioning
    WE/106-2023 / Incident 03/05 11:07
    NPT: 1.25 hrs Cost approximately: 260 000 NOK Repaired hydraulic leak on PS-30 slips.
  • WE/109-2023 / Incident 08/09 06:31
    An project related email sendt by me to Morten Laget, ended up being posted to WEHome feed. This without my knowledge or intent to do so. The . . . nature of the email was not of a sensitive content. The email was sent from tommy.skjolde@wellexpertise.com to morten@wellexpertise.com, with a cc to hseq@wellexpertise.com. Intermediate checks have not given an explanation to why this happened and subsequently not a solution on how to prevent this from happening again. Checks involved Anniken, Daniel and Lars. One question came up during my checks; “Is there some kind of ‘automation’ attached to the cc email address?”
    WE/108-2023 / Incident 03/05 11:59
    NPT: 0.5 hrs Cost approximately: 104 000 NOK Troubleshoot Dop Application Machine (DAM). – Did not retract after function testing
    WE/107-2023 / Incident 03/05 11:50
    NPT: 7.75 hrs Cost approximately: 1 614 000 NOK Cyber chair stopped functioning
    WE/106-2023 / Incident 03/05 11:07
    NPT: 1.25 hrs Cost approximately: 260 000 NOK Repaired hydraulic leak on PS-30 slips.

Latest

  • ARV/6062 Stig 18/01 02:38
    As a part of the rig intake and preparations for the Toppand East Exploration well and Gnomoria Appraisal well, Wellesley petroleum (Wellesley) performed an onshore Verification of COSL Drilling. . .
    ARV/6032 Stig 07/12 11:03
    An offshore verification has been carried out on Deepsea Yantai during the period 28th September – 2nd October 2023. Objective to perform an offshore inspection with spot‐checks from listed. . .
    ARV/6009 Stig 07/12 10:04
    Vår Energi performed an interview with Odfjell “technical and operational support” as well as initial documentation review, as part of the “see to” duty, with regards to lifting. This covers part. . .
    ARV/5961 Stig 10/11 12:39
    As a part of the rig intake and preparations for the Tomcat HPHT exploration well, PGNiG Upstream Norway AS (PUN) performed an onshore review of Odfjell Drilling AS (Odfjell) on both HSE- and. . .
  • ARV/6062 Stig 18/01 02:38
    As a part of the rig intake and preparations for the Toppand East Exploration well and Gnomoria Appraisal well, Wellesley petroleum (Wellesley) performed an onshore Verification of COSL Drilling. . .
    ARV/6032 Stig 07/12 11:03
    An offshore verification has been carried out on Deepsea Yantai during the period 28th September – 2nd October 2023. Objective to perform an offshore inspection with spot‐checks from listed. . .
    ARV/6009 Stig 07/12 10:04
    Vår Energi performed an interview with Odfjell “technical and operational support” as well as initial documentation review, as part of the “see to” duty, with regards to lifting. This covers part. . .
    ARV/5961 Stig 10/11 12:39
    As a part of the rig intake and preparations for the Tomcat HPHT exploration well, PGNiG Upstream Norway AS (PUN) performed an onshore review of Odfjell Drilling AS (Odfjell) on both HSE- and. . .